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Why Lifelong Immunity to CEC and ECs is an Anathema

AN ELECTION COMMISSIONER picked by a government-controlled panel and answerable to no court for official conduct is not the institution that Article 324 envisaged. On September 23, a two-judge bench led by Justice Dipankar Datta split on whether the challenge to that panel, in which the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 replaced the Chief Justice of India with a union minister, must go to a Constitution Bench. The natter now rests with the Chief Justice. In another petition, the Supreme Court issued notice on challenges to Section 16 of the same Act. Section 16 bars every court from entertaining or continuing any civil or criminal proceeding against a person who is or was a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) or Election Commissioner (EC), for anything done or said while acting, or purporting to act, in official duty. The first case asks who chooses the commissioner. The second asks whether anyone can call them to account. While immunity is necessary, the real questions are how far it extends, and who can act when it is abused. Neutrality is not an ornament. Few institutions anywhere hold the power the Election Commission does. Article 324 vests in it the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of every election to Parliament, the state legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President. Since Mohinder Singh Gill (1978), that power has been read as plenary, filling whatever space the statutes leave open. In practice, the Commission decides, among others, who may vote, recognises parties and allots their symbols. During an election, it directs the officials of who work under it during conduct of polls, can transfer them, enforce the Model Code even against a sitting Prime Minister, and can countermand a poll. Power of this kind is exercised against the those occupying high constitutional offices, and every significant order has the potential to disappoint someone very powerful. In electoral politics, as in sports, those who lose the contest are often quick to blame the institution that oversaw it . Often, the party the Commission must be willing to rule and regulate during elections is the mighty government of the day, which commands the police, the tax authorities, and the investigative agencies. Hence, a shield worth having must protect a commissioner from the ruling party in power and other entities, be they opposition parties or any authority. Neutrality is not an ornament of the poll panel. It is the constitutional reason for its being, and immunity is the condition that makes that neutrality possible in practice. In 2019, after Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa recorded dissents on the issue of alleged violation of model code of conduct by Prime Minister, members of his family received income-tax notices . He left the Commission the next year . Former Chief Election Commissioner S Y Qureshi in his Indian Express article, ECs real test: Winning the confidence of the Opposition published on August 10, 2026 sharply remarked, Even Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa protested, for which he was hounded out. ( https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/s-y-quraishi-writes-ecs-real-test-winning-the-confidence-of-the-opposition-10825425/ ) Functional immunity protects the actions legitimately carried out, not the office-holder, so it must outlive the tenure, or every commissioner would spend the last year in office anticipating retaliation. The same shield, minus the safeguards Section 16 copies Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 almost word for word; however, it omits Section 3(2), which preserves the power of the Union, the States, the Supreme Court and the High Courts to proceed against a sitting or former judge, whether by civil, criminal or departmental action. That omission is as significant as it is the entirety of the account. A judges accountability is not built around a single mechanism but rather a ladder. Under K. Veeraswami (1991), a judge can be prosecuted for corruption once the Chief Justice of India has been consulted. Under the in-house procedure, recognised in C. Ravichandran Iyer (1995) and adopted by the full court in 1999, the CJI can order a fact-finding inquiry, withdraw judicial work, advise resignation and refer the findings to the President and the Prime Minister. None of this exists for the Election Commission. A CEC cannot be prosecuted for anything done in the name of official duty, with or without sanction. He cannot face a departmental inquiry, because no disciplinary authority sits above a constitutional functionary and the 2023 Act creates none. There is no in-house equivalent is also available. Who Acts Against a Partisan commissioner? Now take the hardest case. Suppose a commissioner is credibly accused of bending the office he occupies for serving partisan purposes, scheduling elections to put the ruling party in power in an advantageous position, conducting revision of electoral roll in a violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or the selectively enforcing the Model Code to target opposition parties. What is the remedy available against such egregious violation of law and principles of neutrality on the part of such an errant Commissioner? Courts can certainly review the decision, as the Supreme Court has been doing in the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls, because Section 16 bars proceedings against persons, not scrutiny of orders. Rameshwar Prasad (2006) drew the same line for Governors. But review can at best set a decision aside. It cannot hold anyone to account. Even then, Mala fides are notoriously hard to prove on affidavits; Article 329(b) defers most challenges to an election petition, for which even manifest illegality or glaring arbitrariness cannot be a ground to get early relief through Writs. For a Commissioner whose work is manifestly biased, illegal and who is bypassing procedures with impunity to provide advantage or favours to those who chose him, a criminal trial is barred. A civil suit is barred. A departmental inquiry does not exist. Only removal by Parliament remains, and that too is available only for the CEC and not the other two commissioners, who can be removed on the recommendation of the CEC under the proviso to Article 324(5). It prescribes no inquiry preceding the action against a Commissioner by the CEC. It means that an Election Commissioner is shielded from the courts but remains vulnerable to removal from office on account of recommendation of CEC whose decision she/he might not agree with. Unlike the Election Commissioners the CEC can be removed from her/his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. It means that the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 must be followed and a notice must be signed by 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members to remove and the presiding officer may admit or refuse it. If it is admitted, a three-member committee examines the facts. Even if the committee finds the CEC guilty, removal is no easy task, as a two-thirds majority of those present and voting must be secured in both the Houses of Parliament. It is stated above that the government-controlled panel is appointing the CEC. If the allegations concern favouritism of CEC towards the Government, then it is less likely that the notice of impeachment would even succeed at the initial stage of admission because in the present context the presiding officers of both the Houses of Parliament do not have a record of acting impartially on several notices moved by opposition parties. Therefore, the possibility of an impeachment motion succeeding against an ECI is very remote in later stages because the ruling party has more number of MPs both in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. On April 6, 2026, the Lok Sabha Speaker and the Rajya Sabha Chairman, without providing detailed reasons, declined to admit notices signed by 193 Opposition MPs seeking the removal of CEC Gyanesh Kumar, over the gross irregularities associated with the implementation of SIR in West Bengal. On the issue of September 23 Indian Express expose of the alleged irregularities committed by CEC Gyanesh Kumar while conducting SIR while opposition parties are demanding his resignation BJP, being the ruling party, is defending it. Sadly, it clearly adding weight to the charge that he is partisan in his functioning. In Anoop Baranwal (2023) SC while upholding the constitutionally mandated vision of an independent Election Commissioner very forcefully underlined its independence by stating that A person, who is weak kneed before the powers that be, cannot be appointed as an Election Commissioner. A person, who is in a state of obligation or feels indebted to the one who appointed him, the apex court remarked, fails the nation and can have no place in the conduct of elections, forming the very foundation of the democracy. It then proceeded to add, An independent person cannot be biased. Holding the scales evenly, even in the stormiest of times, not being servile to the powerful, but coming to the rescue of the weak and the wronged, who are otherwise in the right, would qualify as true independence. Upholding the constitutional values, which are, in fact, a part of the Basic Structure, and which includes, democracy, the Rule of Law, the Right to Equality, secularism and the purity of elections otherwise, would, indeed, proclaim the presence of independence. Independence must embrace the ability to be firm, even as against the highest. Section 16 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 , providing life long immunity to CEC and EC makes them dependent on the present ruling party by subtraction. The constitutional test The petitioners argued in their petition that their strongest ground against Modi Government granting immunity is Article 14. Commission's independence has been secured by the Constitution itself. Immunity is rationally connected to it. Proportionality's third limb asks whether a less restrictive measure would serve the same end. Parliament's own statute book answers that question. The conditional shield of the 1985 Act and the sanction model of the BNSS protect officials just as well without abolishing accountability altogether. The settled nexus test points the same way. Since Matajog Dobey (1955), protection has covered only acts reasonably connected with duty, and Prakash Singh Badal (2007) held that corruption never qualifies as reasonably connected with duty. Keep the shield, restore the checks. In our opinion, the Court should read Section 16 down. A complete scheme should preserve immunity against private suits but subject it to prior leave from a judicial authority, such as the CJI, applicable to both private complainants and the State, so that commissioners are protected from harassment without being granted impunity. There should further be created a standing inquiry body on the in-house model, to find facts and report to the President, with its report placed before the presiding officers whenever a removal motion is moved. And, finally, CECs tenure protection should be extended to the ECs, as the Law Commission recommended in its 255th Report . A commission that decides who may vote must itself be held accountable for its acts of commission and omission. Section 16 must not become a fortress for the partisan one.

18 Nov 2026 1:09 pm